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Abstract
The empirical evidence on nominal exchange rate dynamics shows a long-run rela-
tionship of this variable with the fundamentals of the economy, although such rela-
tionship disappears at shorter horizons. This apparently contrasting behaviour of 
the nominal exchange rate can be explained in an overlapping generations model 
where the currencies are not perfect substitutes. In this framework, we show that the 
nominal exchange rate is pinned down by the fundamentals at the monetary steady 
state. We study the local dynamics and show that when the monetary steady state 
is locally indeterminate, then fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around its 
long-run value can emerge. In particular, we prove the existence of stationary sun-
spot equilibria, where random fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate arise as a 
result of self-fulfilling beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Friedman (1953) famously argued that “a flexible exchange rate need not be an 
unstable exchange rate. If it is, it is primarily because there is underlying instability 
in the economic conditions governing international trade”. In other words, Fried-
man’s view was that the exchange rate volatility that we observe between any two 
currencies is just a symptom of the volatility of the fundamentals of the underlying 
economies. However, the notion that there is a strong correlation between exchange 
rates and fundamentals has been widely questioned over the years. More precisely, 
two empirical regularities have emerged from the literature. On the one hand, there 
is evidence that the long-run value of the exchange rate is somewhat tied to funda-
mentals.1 On the other hand, it is very difficult to understand and predict its behav-
iour at shorter horizons.2
Any macroeconomic model that wishes to capture these puzzling dynamics of 
the nominal exchange rate should therefore have two main properties: on the one 
hand, the nominal exchange rate should be a function of the fundamentals at the 
steady state of the economy; at the same time, there should exist equilibria where 
the nominal exchange rate fluctuates around its long-run value but not as a result 
of randomness in the fundamentals of the economy. However, in existing monetary 
open economy models the nominal exchange rate is either always pinned down by 
the fundamentals (e.g. Lucas 1982; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) or always indetermi-
nate (e.g. Kareken and Wallace 1981).
The aim of this paper is then to propose a simple model which possesses both the 
above-mentioned empirical regularities. In a two-country, two-currency OLG model 
where the two currencies are not perfect substitutes, we show that while the nominal 
exchange rate is pinned down by the fundamentals of the economies at the monetary 
steady state, fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run value can 
arise even in the absence of shocks to economic fundamentals. We also establish 
conditions for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria, where self-fulfilling 
beliefs are the driving force of nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
For this purpose, we study a two-country overlapping generations model with two 
consumption goods and two currencies. In this economy, agents live for two periods 
and they are endowed with a country-specific good.3 They are also subject to cash-
in-advance constraints, in the sense that they need the domestic (foreign) currency 
1 Mark (1995) has shown that the predictability of the exchange rate increases at longer horizons. More-
over, Groen (2000), Mark and Sul (2001), Rapach and Wohar (2012) and Cerra and Saxena (2010) have 
all documented the existence of a long-run relationship between exchange rates and monetary fundamen-
tals, such as money supplies and output differentials, using cointegration analysis.
2 See, e.g. the seminal paper of Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Rossi (2013) for a recent review of the lit-
erature. The weak short-run relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is sometimes referred 
to as the “exchange rate disconnect” puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001).
3 The assumption that agents are only endowed with a country-specific good is only made to simplify the 
notation. Allowing partial instead of complete specialisation would not change our main results. We also 
restrict our attention to “Samuelsonian economies”, where the value of the endowment when old is suf-
ficiently small to generate a positive demand for money (Gale 1973).
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to buy the domestic (foreign good). The timing works as follows. At the beginning 
of the first period, agents sell their endowment to buy a portfolio of domestic and 
foreign currency. Next, they spend part of their money holdings to acquire the con-
sumption goods in the current period while keeping the remaining balances to fund 
consumption next period. Therefore, both currencies can be used as stores of value. 
In the second period, the old do not have access to currency markets so they simply 
spend the currencies acquired when young in the respective goods’ markets. The 
lack of participation of old people in currency markets is motivated by empirical 
evidence showing that investors’ behaviour is characterised by considerable inertia, 
which is even more acute during old age.4 Once a portfolio is chosen, investors seem 
not to readjust their portfolio even if market conditions change. A common explana-
tion for this empirical finding is that the costs associated with actively managing a 
portfolio (which typically involve collecting and processing information) are simply 
too high. When that is the case, e.g. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2010) and Kim 
et al. (2016) show that it is indeed optimal for agents’ not to readjust their portfolio.5
This friction, combined with the cash-in-advance constraints, implies that young 
agents choose their portfolio of currencies taking into account their future demand 
for the two goods. As a consequence, the relative value of the two currencies today 
(i.e. the nominal exchange rate) is linked to the old’s marginal utility for the two 
goods and their expected prices. For instance, if the domestic good is expected to 
be more expensive in the following period, the domestic currency has a lower pur-
chasing power. This leads to a lower demand for the domestic currency, hence to an 
exchange rate depreciation in the current period.
Our model differs significantly from the standard OLG model with one good and 
one currency which has been extensively studied in the literature.6 To start with, we 
need to track the dynamic behaviour of three endogenous variables (instead of one): 
the prices of the two consumption goods and the nominal exchange rate. Moreo-
ver, we have two dynamic inequality constraints in the price of both goods and the 
nominal exchange rate, which require that the demand for the domestic currency is 
always positive.7 For a CES utility function which is additively separable across the 
two goods (as well as intertemporally separable), we show that the model is analyti-
cally tractable as the dynamics of each of the two goods’ prices can be studied inde-
pendently from one another. More specifically, we show that the dynamic behaviour 
of the world economy can be fully characterised by: (1) two difference equations in 
the two prices; (2) an equation for the nominal exchange rate, which is pinned down 
by the expected prices of the two goods, and finally (3) the two dynamic inequality 
constraints.
4 See, e.g. Agnew et al. (2003), Bilias et al. (2010), Fagareng et al. (2017) and Kim et al. (2016).
5 Kim et al. (2016) argue that active management is even less likely in old age because of higher mortal-
ity risk and falling efficiency in decision making, reducing old people’s participation in asset markets.
6 See, e.g. Woodford (1984) for a literature review.
7 Note that the demand for the foreign currency is always positive, since agents are only endowed with 
the country-specific good.
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In this context, we prove that the nominal exchange rate is determined by the 
fundamentals of the economy at the monetary steady state. Two among the deter-
minants of the exchange rate, relative money supplies and aggregate endowments, 
are common to other monetary models of exchange rate determinacy (e.g. Frankel 
1979; Lucas 1982).8 In our setting, the nominal exchange rate also depends on how 
much of each good is saved by the young, as currencies serve the function of stores 
of value. In particular, higher savings of the domestic good are associated with 
an appreciation of the domestic currency. As the young’s excess supply of a good 
increases, its price falls and hence the purchasing power of the domestic currency in 
units of the domestic good increases. As the domestic currency is worth more, then 
its demand increases, hence the appreciation in equilibrium.
Therefore, our model is consistent with empirical evidence showing that funda-
mentals such as relative money supply and output drive the behaviour of the nomi-
nal exchange rate at long horizons (see, e.g. Cerra and Saxena 2010; Rapach and 
Wohar 2012).
Next, we demonstrate why econometricians struggle to find a strong correlation 
between the exchange rate and the fundamentals of the economy at shorter horizons. 
Firstly, we study the local dynamics around the monetary steady state and prove that 
the monetary steady state is indeterminate under some parameter conditions. This 
implies that there are multiple paths of the nominal exchange rate converging to the 
monetary steady state. Therefore, randomness in the fundamentals is not required to 
generate exchange rate fluctuations around the monetary steady state.
Secondly, we investigate whether fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate 
around the monetary steady state can emerge as a result of self-fulfilling beliefs. In 
particular, we study the conditions under which stationary sunspot equilibria exist. 
As Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) argued, focusing on stationarity sunspot equi-
libria is important for two reasons: firstly, because stable beliefs can be the asymp-
totic outcome of learning processes; secondly, this is a first step towards understand-
ing dynamical sunspot behaviour. In a one-currency one-good economy, Azariadis 
(1981) showed that sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary sunspot equi-
libria are the complementarity between consumption and leisure and the local stabil-
ity (indeterminacy) of the monetary steady state. In our framework, we prove that 
if similar conditions hold, then stationary sunspot equilibria exist. In particular, we 
show that self-fulfilling beliefs that prices are stochastic can generate random fluc-
tuations of the nominal exchange rate. For instance, suppose that agents believe that 
the price of good 1 goes down. This implies that the real interest rate in country 1 
(measured as the change over time in the purchasing power of the domestic currency 
in units of the domestic good) goes up. We show that this leads to an immediate 
appreciation of currency 1. Hence, the nominal exchange rate follows a stochastic 
process merely dictated by agents’ beliefs.
8 We also show that Lucas’ (1982) exchange rate equation can be retrieved by imposing that the endow-
ment of the old is zero. Crucially, the equivalence between this model and Lucas’ only holds in the long 
run, as exchange rate and fundamentals are disconnected outside the monetary steady state in our frame-
work.
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This paper shows that it is then possible to construct equilibria which repli-
cate the two main features of the dynamics of the nominal exchange rates: while 
our model can easily rationalise the weak relationship between the exchange rate 
and fundamentals in the short-run, empirical evidence which points at the higher 
predictability of the nominal exchange rate in the long run can also be reconciled 
within this framework.
In our main model set-up, we assume that there is no consumption home bias 
for tractability reasons. This implies that the purchasing power parity (PPP) condi-
tion holds by assumption.9 However, it is well known that PPP does not actually 
hold empirically (see, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001; Rogoff 1996). As Itskhoki and 
Mukhin (2017) argue, this is one of the main aspects of the “exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle”. In fact, the nominal exchange rate does not seem to be disconnected 
just from the fundamentals but also from other macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation differentials. This is corroborated by the fact that there seems to be a strong 
correlation between the real and the nominal exchange rate in the data (see also 
Burstein and Gopinath 2014).
We then introduce home bias in consumption to depart from the PPP condition. 
In this framework, we show that there is comovement between the nominal and the 
real exchange rate consistently with the data.
Finally, we show that our main results are not sensitive to the friction in cur-
rency markets. We change the timing of the model allowing old agents to choose the 
portfolio of currencies that they require to buy the consumption goods. At the same 
time, we impose that the young can only use the domestic currency as a store of 
value, to avoid that the nominal exchange rate is always constant and indeterminate 
as in Kareken and Wallace (1981). As in our main setup, the steady-state nominal 
exchange rate depends on fundamentals and it can be locally indeterminate, giving 
rise to the possibility of fluctuations unrelated to shocks to the fundamentals.10
Our paper significantly contributes to the theoretical debate on the (in) determi-
nacy of the nominal exchange rate. In particular, our framework provides a solution 
to the well-known indeterminacy problem arising in Kareken and Wallace’s (KW) 
overlapping generations model (1981), which is documented in many textbooks 
such as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Champ et al. (2016). This can be briefly 
explained as follows. When agents have more than one currency to use as store of 
value, then agents would regard the two currencies as perfect substitutes. There are 
infinitely many portfolios which are consistent with agents’ consumption choices, 
and each real variables’ equilibrium path is associated with any arbitrary constant 
value of the nominal exchange rate. Differently from our paper, there is no equation 
that pins down the relative demand for the two currencies, and hence their relative 
price.
9 In other words, the price of the consumption basket of two countries, when converted into the same 
currency, is the same when PPP holds.
10 The local indeterminacy of the monetary steady state is proved numerically, as this set-up is not as 
analytically tractable as our main framework.
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Our paper is also related to the following contributions on sunspot equilibria 
in open economy: Manuelli and Peck (1990), King et  al. (1992), Russell (2003), 
Li (2014), Pietra and Salto (2013) and Platonov (2019). Although these contribu-
tions are able to explain why it is difficult to predict the exchange rate at short hori-
zons, they fall short in capturing the empirical evidence on the long-run relation-
ship between the exchange rate and fundamentals. The main reason is that, in their 
papers, the nominal exchange rate is always indeterminate.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the model and show 
how the dynamic equilibrium system can be simplified. We characterise the mone-
tary steady state in Sect. 3 and the local dynamics around it in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we 
investigate the conditions under which stationary sunspot equilibria exist. In Sect. 6, 
we explore some extensions and do some robustness exercises. Section 7 concludes. 
The derivations can be found in “Appendix 1”, while the proofs in “Appendix 2”.
2  The model
We study the following two-country pure exchange overlapping generations econ-
omy. Time is discrete, and a generic date is indicated with t. At each t, an agent is 
born in each country with a two-period lifetime, where a = 1, 2 refers to age. We 
indicate with h = 1, 2 the agent living in country h while  = 1, 2 refers to the good 
or the currency. For instance, c
ah,t
 is the consumption of good  of the agent born 
in country h in period of life a at time t. Agents are endowed with a country-spe-
cific good in both periods of life: agents born in country 1 (2) are endowed with 
good 1 (2). Since our objective is to show that there exist fluctuations in the nominal 
exchange rate not related to fluctuations in the fundamentals, we assume that endow-










) = (0, y2
a
) for every a.
There also exists a generation that lives only in period 0. These agents are “the 
old” at time 0 and are endowed with some units of the domestic currency and the 
domestic good. The total endowment of the two currencies is indicated with M1 and 
M2 and the monetary authorities are inactive in the following periods.
The main features of our model are the following. Firstly, the two currencies are 
not perfect substitutes, in the sense that each of them cannot be used to buy any 
good. In fact, we assume that currency 1 (2) can only buy good 1 (2) in a cash-
in-advance fashion. In addition, the old are not allowed to change their portfolio 
before spending the currencies in the respective goods’ markets. As we stressed in 
the introduction, the lack of participation to currency markets of the old is consist-
ent with empirical evidence showing that investors are characterised by considerable 
inertia, especially during old age.11 Previous literature argues that this behaviour can 
be explained by the high costs that agents need to incur to actively manage a portfo-
lio. If the costs are sufficiently high, investors’ inertia is then entirely consistent with 
rational behaviour.12
11 See, e.g. Agnew et al. (2003), Bilias et al. (2010), Fagareng et al. (2017) and Kim et al. (2016).
12 See Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2010) and Kim et al. (2016).
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The budget constraints of an agent born in country h at date t are therefore the 
following:
At the beginning of the period, the young are endowed with some wealth w1h,t . Since 
agents are only endowed with a country-specific good, the wealth of the two agents 
when young is respectively w11,t ∶= p1t y
1
1
 and w12,t ∶= p2t ety
2
1
 . We indicate with 
p
t
 the price of good  in units of the domestic currency and with et the nominal 
exchange rate or the price of currency 2 in units of currency 1, where the latter is the 
numéraire currency. Firstly, young agents sell their initial endowment (to the old) to 
buy the two currencies (Eq. 1). m̄
h,t
 are the money purchases of agent h of currency 
 at the beginning of the period, while m
h,t
 denotes the money holdings at the end 
of the period. In fact, m̄
h,t
 will partly be spent to buy the country-specific good in 
the current period (Eqs. 2, 3), while the rest will be saved to buy the consumption 
good in the next period. In other words, Eqs. (2) and (3) are the cash-in-advance 
constraints of the young.
When old, agents use the money saved in the previous period to buy the con-
sumption goods in the respective markets (Eqs. 4, 5).13
It can be observed that the constraints of the young can be consolidated into the 
following constraint:
Therefore, the problem of an agent born in country h is to choose consumption 
allocations 1h,t ∶= (c11h,t, c
2
1h,t
) , 2h,t+1 ∶= (c12h,t+1, c
2
2h,t+1






















































13 Notice that the cash-in-advance constraints of the old slightly differ from the cash-in-advance con-
straints of the young since the endowment y
2h
 enter Eqs. (4) and (5). Due to the lack of participation to 
currency markets, the old cannot sell their endowment to buy the two currencies.
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where 𝜎 > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and  ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor.14
The Lagrangian as well as the (necessary and sufficient) first-order conditions of 
the agents’ maximisation problem can be found in “Appendix 1”.
Combining Eqs. (51)–(54), it can be shown that the nominal exchange rate is 
pinned down by the following equation:
Firstly, the nominal exchange rate depends on the old’s marginal utility for the 
two goods. For instance, if the marginal utility of good 2 goes up, then the agent 
demands more currency 2 which leads to a currency appreciation ( et increases). Sec-
ondly, it is linked to the two currencies’ expected return, as measured by their pur-
chasing power. An appreciation of currency 2 can also occur if the price of good 2 
falls relatively more than the price of good 1. Since currency 2’s purchasing power 
would increase in relative terms, then agents’ demand for currency 2 would rise.
Differently from Kareken and Wallace (1981), we have an Eq. (8) which pins 
down the path of the nominal exchange rate. Since agents cannot readjust their port-
folios when old, they make their portfolio decision at t looking only at the future 
prices of the two goods without taking into account the relative value of the two cur-
rencies at t + 1 . On the contrary, if old agents were allowed to participate to currency 
markets, agents would take into account et+1 when making their decision. However, 
the two currencies would be seen as perfect substitutes as stores of value. Hence, 
there would be no equation to pin down the value of the nominal exchange rate, as in 
Kareken and Wallace (1981). Each real allocation can be supported by any constant 
value of e.15
Rearranging the first-order conditions, we find agents’ portfolios by calculating 




















































































14 This utility function implies that preferences across the two goods are separable. We adopt this speci-
fication for tractability reasons, since we can study analytically the dynamics around the monetary steady 
state (see Sect. 4). We also assume that agents assign the same weight to the domestic and the foreign 
good to make notation less cumbersome, but our main results hold if home bias is allowed (see Sect. 6).
15 See the Supplementary material (Section A) for more details on this point.
16 We show the main steps in the Supplementary Material (Section B).
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It can be noticed that agents’ demand for the foreign currency is always positive, 
since they are not endowed with the foreign good. The holdings of the domestic cur-
rency are instead positive as long as the numerators of (9) and (12) are strictly positive. 
In particular, we have that
Since the right-hand side of both equations is greater than one, it follows that a nec-
essary (but not sufficient) condition for money holdings of the domestic currency to 
be positive in each country, is:
The value of the endowment when old must be sufficiently small as compared to the 
value of the endowment when young, i.e. the economy must be Samuelsonian (Gale 
1973). However, Eqs. (13) and (14) are more stringent than the standard Samuelso-
nian condition. In fact, the demand for the domestic currency will also depend on 
the price of the foreign good in the two periods. In particular, a higher price of the 
foreign good leads to a higher (lower) demand for the domestic good (and hence for 
the domestic currency) if the elasticity of substitution is higher (lower) than one.
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Finally, the maximisation problem of the initial old and its solution can be found in 
“Appendix 1”.
2.1  Monetary equilibrium
We are now ready to give a definition of monetary equilibrium.
Definition 1 A monetary equilibrium is any sequence of strictly positive nominal 





















for every h, such that: 
1. Each agent h maximises her utility function subject to her constraints at any t.




















= M∀ , t.
In “Appendix  1”, we derive the system of equations which characterises the 
dynamics of the economy. These are:
where p1
t
> 0 , p2
t
> 0 for any t ≥ 0 , plus the inequality constraints (13) and (14), 
which guarantee strictly positive money demands.
The first observation is that the dynamics of the prices of the two goods can be 
studied independently from each other. The fact that the dynamics take such a sim-
ple form is due to the timing assumption. Since agents cannot readjust their portfolio 
when old, the consumption of the old in the two countries of good 1 (2) is strictly 
related to their savings in currency 1 (2). In fact, aggregating the budget constraints 








 for  = 1, 2 . The goods’ market clearing equations then imply that the 
excess supply of the young for good 1 (2) is equal to the real money balances of cur-







 . In “Appendix 1”, we show that the aggregate consump-
tion of the young of good 1 (2) is strictly related to their own purchases of currency 
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prices of the other good. Hence, we obtain two separate difference equations.17 In 
Sect. 6.2, we will consider an alternative version of the model where the young can 
only use the domestic currency as saving vehicle. Since the savings of each currency 
would then be linked to the purchase of both goods, we will not be able to solve the 
dynamic system in blocks as in this case.
However, notice that the system does not dichotomises completely. The dynamic 
inequality constraints (13) and (14), which have to be respected, depend on both 
prices as well as the nominal exchange rate. Equation (20) shows instead that, in 
equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate is pinned down by the expected prices of the 
two goods. This illustrates further how our model is capable of solving the indeter-
minacy problem in KW (1981). While the nominal exchange rate can be any arbi-
trary constant in KW, we have an equation that disciplines the behaviour of the nom-
inal exchange rate in equilibrium.
In the analysis of the dynamics of the economy, we will then proceed as fol-
lows. First, we study the price sequences emerging from the system (18) and (19). 
We then derive the path of the nominal exchange rate using (20) and finally verify 
numerically that the inequality constraints hold for any t.
3  Long‑run determinants of the exchange rate
In this section, we characterise the monetary steady state of the economy. Firstly, let 
us provide a definition.
Definition 2 A monetary steady state is any monetary equilibrium with strictly 




) for every a, h.
Because money supplies are constant, it can be shown that stationarity in consump-
tion implies that the goods’ prices and the nominal exchange rate are also constant. In 
fact, let us consider the budget constraint of the old for good 1 (Eq. 4) at the steady state:
Aggregating and using the market clearing conditions, we have that:
Since the old’s excess demand is constant, it then follows that p1
t
= p1∗ for every 
t. Looking at Eq. (5), we can derive the same conclusion for the price of good 2: 
p2
t
= p2∗ . Finally, (20) shows that the nominal exchange rate is also constant: et = e∗.
Let us then impose p
t
= p∗ and et = e∗ in Eqs. (18)–(20). This leads us to the 



























17 The separability of the utility function across the two goods is also key. If we changed the utility func-










−1 , the dynamics of the two goods would 
be interdependent. Agents’ preferences would create a “bridge” between the markets.
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Result 1 A monetary steady state exists and is unique. The long-run values of the 
two prices and the nominal exchange rate are:
while the two inequality constraints (13) and (14) become
where ∗ are the terms of trade of the economy:
At the steady state of the economy, we have shown that the nominal exchange 
rate is determinate and a function of the fundamentals of the economy. Our model is 
then consistent with the strand of empirical literature which has found that there is 
a strong long-run relationship between the nominal exchange rate and a simple set 
of monetary fundamentals.18 The fact that the nominal exchange rate is determined 
in a OLG setting is a novel result in the literature. The well-known result concern-
ing nominal exchange rates in OLG models is Kareken and Wallace’s indeterminacy 
proposition. However, as Sargent (1987) correctly argued, this result is not due to 
the demographic structure of the model but rather to the assumption that there is 
room for only one outside asset in the model. In our framework, the cash-in-advance 
constraints plus the lack of participation of old agents to currency markets (so that 
the portfolio of the old is determined in advance) imply that the two currencies are 
not perfect substitutes as stores of value, differently from KW (1981). Hence, the 
level of the nominal exchange rate is pinned down by the fundamentals at the mon-
etary steady state.
In particular, the nominal exchange depends on three different sets of parameters: 































































































18 See, e.g. Mark (1995), Groen (2000), Mark and Sul (2001), Rapach and Wohar (2012) and Cerra and 
Saxena (2010).
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For instance, let us explore what are the circumstances under which currency 1 
depreciates (e increases): (1) an increase in the domestic money supply; (2) a fall 
in savings in good 1; (3) an increase in the domestic aggregate endowment. The 
first channel does not probably need an explanation. The second channel involves 
the relative savings by the young in the two goods. In fact, aggregating the budget 
constraint of the old across agents, we obtain an equation for the savings of good 1:
where p1∗ is known from Result 1. It can be observed that a fall in the supply of 
savings of good 1 implies a higher price for the good. Since currency 1 in units of 
the domestic good is worth less in terms of purchasing power, then it depreciates.19 
Finally, an increase in the aggregate endowment of good 1 implies a depreciation 
of the domestic currency as the relative price of good 1 falls (i.e. the terms of trade 
worsens).
It is worth observing that the second channel is specific to our OLG model. In 
cash-in-advance infinite horizon models à la Lucas (1982), with a CES utility func-
tion, the equilibrium exchange rate is instead equal to:
which can be seen as a specific case of our equation when y
2
= 0 . In this case, the 
young hold all the aggregate output of the economy and an increase in the endow-
ment unambiguously leads to a currency appreciation (depreciation) whenever the 
elasticity of substitution is higher (lower) than 1.
More generally, the level of the nominal exchange rate in the steady state depends 
on the distribution of the aggregate endowment across cohorts. It is therefore useful 




 and investigate their 
sign. It is immediate to see that:
Firstly, let us consider the effect of an increase in the endowment of the young on the 
exchange rate. It can be seen that there are two effects at play. On the one hand, an 
increase in the endowment of the young increases savings. Hence, there is a higher 
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19 Notice that savings can fall due to the following reasons: a fall in the endowment when young, an 
increase in the endowment when old or a fall in the discount factor.
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other hand, an increase in the endowment of the young causes a deterioration of the 
terms of trade, which instead leads the currency to depreciate. It can be seen that the 
first effect always dominates whenever the domestic and the foreign good are substi-
tutes ( 𝜎 > 1 ). The sign of the derivative is also positive when  = 1 . When the goods 
are complements, the sign is instead ambiguous.
On the other hand, an increase in the endowment of the old always causes a cur-
rency depreciation. In fact, this leads to lower savings (hence, to a lower demand for 
the domestic currency) as well as to a deterioration of the terms of trade.
4  Local dynamics
In this section, we study the dynamics of the economy around the monetary steady 
state. Equation (20) shows that the nominal exchange rate is pinned down by next 
period’s price levels. Hence, it suffices to study the dynamics of the two prices in 
order to pin down the equilibrium path of the nominal exchange rate and the quan-
tity variables.
As it emerges clearly from Eqs. (18) and (19), this means to study the scalar dif-
ference equation:
and more specifically the local stability of its unique steady state:
with p∗ > 0 as long as y1 > 𝛽−𝜎y2 ≡ ȳ . The superscripts have been dropped to 
make the notation less cumbersome.20 Before proceeding, we define the following 
concepts.
Definition 3 (Local (In)Determinacy) A steady state p∗ is said to be locally deter-
minate if there exists a unique solution of F(pt, pt+1) = 0 , converging to it. On the 
other hand, a steady state p∗ is locally indeterminate if there is a continuum of solu-
tions of F(pt, pt+1) = 0 , converging to it.
It is worth noting that in our framework the price level is a non-predetermined 
(jump) variable. Therefore, p∗ is locally determinate only if it is locally unstable. In 
fact, there exists only one choice of the initial price, p0 = p∗ , consistent with a long-
run value of the price level equal to p∗ . In other words, the economy jumps at date 
0 to its steady-state value and remains there forever. On the other hand, p∗ is locally 
(24)F(pt, pt+1) ≡ p1−t (M + pt+1y2) − 
p1−
t+1




20 More precisely, we should notice that F(pt, pt+1) = 0 is an (implicit) function when 𝜎 > 1 and a cor-
respondence when 𝜎 < 1 (See the Supplementary Material, Section C). This finding is well known in 
the literature (see Grandmont 1985). In studying the local dynamics when 𝜎 < 1 , we will characterise a 
subset of the existing equilibria.
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indeterminate if it is locally stable. In fact, there are a continuum of solutions con-
verging to it.
We are now ready to prove under which conditions on the parameters of the econ-
omy we have local determinacy and local indeterminacy of the steady state.21
Proposition 1 p∗ is locally determinate if and only if one of the following condi-
tions is satisfied: 
1. y1 ∈ (ȳ,∞) and  ∈ [1,∞)
2. y1 ∈ (ȳ, ỹ) and  ∈ (0, 1);




4. y1 ∈ (ỹ,∞) ,  ∈ (0,
1
2
) and  ∈ [1 − 2, 1] or
5. y1 ∈ (ỹ, y◦) ,  ∈ (0,
1
2
) and  ∈ (0, 1 − 2).
On the other hand, p∗ is locally indeterminate if the following conditions hold:
while p∗ is non-hyperbolic when y1 = y◦.22 The thresholds of y1 are equal to
Proposition  1 shows the conditions under which the steady-state price of each 
good is either determinate or indeterminate, since the dynamics of the two prices are 
independent. However, the determinacy or indeterminacy of the stationary monetary 
equilibrium will be the consequence of the behaviour of both price levels. Follow-
ing Proposition 1, it is straightforward to identify situations in which the stationary 
monetary equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
Result 2 The monetary steady state is locally indeterminate if the following condi-















and  ∈ (0, 1 − 2),




𝛽𝜎(1 − 2𝜎) − 1
(𝛽𝜎 + 2𝜎 − 1)
y2𝛽
−𝜎 .
21 We acknowledge that Eq. (24) has been investigated in a closed-economy framework before (e.g. 
Blanchard and Fisher 1989; Benassy 2011 for a review). However, our results differs from previous con-
tributions for three reasons. First, previous studies analysed Eq. (24) using an offer curve. Therefore, they 
looked at the dynamics in a different variable, namely real money balances. Secondly, we have found no 
contributions where the parameters’ conditions for the emergence of local determinacy or indeterminacy 
have been given in such details as we do in Proposition  1. Finally, the prices’ dynamics have also to 
respect the inequality constraints (13) and (14), which are different than in previous studies.
22 A steady state x∗ of a scalar difference equation xt+1 = F(xt) is non-hyperbolic if |F�(x∗)| = 1 . If a 
steady state is non-hyperbolic, then the local stable manifold theorem (e.g. Kuznetsov 1998,  Theo-
rem 2.3, p. 50) does not hold, i.e. the local dynamics around x∗ is no more a “good approximation” of the 
global dynamics.
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First of all, the indeterminacy of the monetary steady state depends on the exist-
ence of a sufficiently strong income effect, as known in the literature. In the one-
good, one-currency OLG model, this requires that the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, the discount factor and the endowment when old are all relatively low.23
In our two-good, two-currency economy, it is also the case that we need a rela-
tively low intertemporal elasticy of substitution and discount factor. The novelty of 
this paper is that the indeterminacy of the monetary steady state is tied to the rela-
tive endowments of the two countries. In fact, this is the main source of heterogene-
ity in the model, as preferences are identical across countries. For indeterminacy to 
emerge, the endowment of the young must be higher than the bifurcation point y◦ for 
at least one country. Therefore, indeterminacy can occur even if the endowment of 
the old in one of the two countries is relatively high.24 If we considered such coun-
try in a closed economy context, where agents only gain utility from the domestic 
good, then the same values of  and  would imply the determinacy of the monetary 
steady state. But in an open economy context, the monetary steady state is indeter-
minate if the old in the other country have a sufficiently low endowment.
For instance, let us consider the following example where the two agents have the 
same endowment when old. This implies that the two countries have the same y◦ as a 
threshold. Suppose that country 1 has an endowment when young below the thresh-
old and country 2 above the threshold. We can then construct an equilibrium around 
the monetary steady state where p1
0
= p1∗ (see left side of Fig. 1) while any arbitrary 
p2
0
 sufficiently close to p2∗ will converge to p2∗ according to Proposition 1 (see right 
side of Fig. 1). To draw the picture, we have chosen parameter values as follows: 




= 1 , which implies that y◦ = 14 . 
Assume that the young of country 1 is endowed with y1
1
= 13 < y◦ , while the young 
of country 2 with y2
1
= 19 > y◦ . Since there is local indeterminacy in the price p2
t
 , 
we have also arbitrarily chosen the initial price level so that it is 1% higher than the 
steady state value. We need also to check that money demands are strictly positive, 
i.e. the inequality constraints (13) and (14) hold. Observe that these two inequality 




) given the path of the 
other price ( p1
t
= p1∗ for every t) and the path of the nominal exchange rate which 
can be derived from (20) once the paths for the two prices are known. Therefore, we 




 lies within the region where both 
money demands are positive, i.e. not in the grey regions of Fig. 1.
We can now comment on the dynamics of the exchange rate. As explained before, 
Eq. (20) pins down the path of the nominal exchange rate once the paths of the two 
prices are known:
23 See, e.g. Woodford (1984) and Blanchard and Fisher (1989).
24 Just to recall that if the endowment of the old is relatively high, then savings tend to be lower so the 
impact of a change in the real interest rate on savings is smaller everything else equal. Hence, income 
effects are weaker. See, e.g. Bhattacharya and Russell (2003).
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For any given p2
0
 , Eq. (24) will pin down a value for p2
1
 , which will then determine 
the nominal exchange rate at time 0 through Eq. (26). Any given p2
0
 will give rise 
to a different path for the price of good 2 and hence a different path for the nominal 
exchange rate. Once p2
t
 converges to p2∗ , so will the nominal exchange converge to 
its long-run value.
5  Stationary sunspot equilibria
The aim of this section is to show that, although the nominal exchange rate is pinned 
down by the fundamentals of the economy at the monetary steady state, persistent 
fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run value can arise in the 
absence of shocks to the fundamentals of the economy. Hence, our model can help 
to explain why there seems to be a disconnect between the exchange rate and funda-
mentals, especially at shorter horizons.
In particular, we will investigate whether fluctuations of the nominal exchange 
rate around the monetary steady state can be generated by agents’ beliefs that prices 
are stochastic. More precisely, we will provide conditions for the existence of sta-
tionary sunspot equilibria.25
Following the literature (e.g. Azariadis 1981), we assume that beliefs (and, since 
they are self-fulfilling, equilibrium prices) follow a simple two-state Markov pro-
cess: S = {a, b} . Since we have two agents born in each period, beliefs can poten-
tially be different across agents. Let h be a stationary transition probability matrix, 
where the element h(ij) is the probability that agent h assigns to state j tomorrow 



























25 Stationary sunspot equilibria are not the only type of persistent fluctuations around the monetary 
steady state which exist in this framework. In the Supplementary Material (Section F), we provide a 
detailed analysis of the existence of endogenous periodic cycles in the nominal exchange rate.
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subject to the following constraints26:







 and use the definition of the terms of trade of the econ-
omy ( (s) ≡ p
2(s)e(s)
p1(s)
 ) to rewrite the above budget constraints as follows:




































































































































Fig. 1  An example of a locally indeterminate monetary steady state
26 For simplicity, we assume that the endowment of the old is zero.
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In “Appendix 1”, we derive the first-order conditions of the maximisation prob-




(s) which satisfy the following 
two equations:
Next, let us define m̃(s) ≡ M

p(s)
 . We can now introduce a definition of stationary 
sunspot equilibrium.
Definition 4 Given h , a stationary sunspot equilibrium is a system of prices 
(s) ∈ ℝ++ and (s) ∈ ℝ2++ , consumption allocations 1h(s) ∈ ℝ++ , 2h(ss
�) ∈ ℝ++ 
and portfolio allocations ̃h(s) ∈ ℝ++ such that: 
1. Agent h maximises his utility function (28) subject to the budget constraints 
















(s) = m̃(s) ∀ s,
4. at least one of the following holds: p1(a) ≠ p1(b) , p2(a) ≠ p2(b) , (a) ≠ (b).
5. 0 < 𝜋h(aa),𝜋h(bb) < 1
Our definition excludes the degenerate cases where the economy either ends up in 
one state of nature ( h(aa) = 1 or h(bb) = 1 ) or in a two-period cycle (when 
h(ab) = 1 and h(ba) = 1).27 In our two-country world, three prices can potentially 
fluctuate: the nominal prices of the two goods p1(s) and p2(s) and the terms of trade 
(s) . Since e(s) ≡ (s)p
1(s)
p2(s)
 , then the nominal exchange rate can also fluctuate as a 
consequence.
The general case where all prices fluctuate is quite cumbersome to deal with. 























































27 See Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) for a discussion and for an investigation of the connections 
between stationary sunspot equilibria and two-period cycles.
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Assumption 1 Agents’ beliefs are specified as follows:
where z, n and x are nonzero numbers.
In other words, agents believe that only the price of good 1 is subject to random 
fluctuations while the other prices are those prevailing at the monetary steady state. 
In fact, Assumption 1 implies that the price of good 1 fluctuates as follows:
It is also easy to see that fluctuations in the price of one good is sufficient to generate 
fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate:
Finally, we assume that agents share the same beliefs about the uncertainty affecting 
the world economy.
In the following Proposition, we prove that stationary sunspot equilibria exist. 
Our strategy is to adapt the proof used by Woodford (1984) in a one-good, one-cur-
rency and one-agent OLG economy to our open economy setting. The idea behind 
is to show that there exists a set of beliefs which supports an equilibrium allocation 
where prices are different across states of nature. The proof relies on a continuity 
argument, i.e. it assumes that prices are extremely close to the steady-state value 
( z → 0).
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, stationary sunspot equilibria exist as long as 
p1∗ is locally indeterminate.
Proposition 2 shows that, in our open economy setting, it is possible to construct 
stationary sunspot equilibria in the neighbourhood of the monetary steady state. 
When p1∗ is locally indeterminate, there is nothing that guarantees that the initial 
price level is equal to the steady-state value: p1
0
= p1∗ . Since a whole range of val-
ues for p1
0
 are possible and consistent with rational expectations, the multiplicity of 
equilibria (which occurs under the conditions shown in Proposition 1) can give rise 
m̃1(a) = m̃1∗ + zn
m̃1(b) = m̃1∗ + zx ⇒ p1(a) ≠ p1(b)
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to sunspot behaviour.28 In particular, we show that if agents believe that the price 
of good 1 follows a first-order Markov process, then stationary sunspot equilibria 
exist. Importantly, this leads to self-fulfilling fluctuations of the nominal exchange 
rate. When the price of good 1 goes up (down), currency 1’s purchasing power falls 
(increases); hence, it depreciates (appreciates). Fluctuations of the nominal exchange 
rate are purely driven by agents’ beliefs that the real interest rate in one country 
changes over time. To show this clearly, we have assumed that the fundamentals of 
the economy remain constant.29
It is important to stress that the type of sunspot equilibria that we construct are 
different from other contributions in the OLG literature such as Manuelli and Peck 
(1990) and King et al. (1992). In these papers, the nominal exchange rate is always 
indeterminate: since (at least a subset of) agents have unrestricted access to currency 
markets, then the two currencies have the same rate of return. Since the nominal 
exchange rate cannot be pinned down, it follows that it is possible to construct paths 
for the nominal exchange rate which are unrelated to fundamentals. In this paper, 
currencies are not perfect substitutes because of the cash-in-advance constraints 
and the lack of access of the old to currency markets. Agents’ demand for the two 
currencies depends on the expected purchasing power of the two goods as well as 
agents’ marginal utilities, which implies that we have an equation that disciplines the 
behaviour of the nominal exchange rate (Eq. 20). Therefore, the existence of sunspot 
equilibria in the nominal exchange rate is not obvious in our setting. Proposition 2 
then studies the conditions under which stationary sunspot equilibria exist.
The result in Proposition 2 also relates to the literature on stationary sunspot equi-
libria in closed economy. In the one-good, one-currency and one-agent per genera-
tion OLG economy, Azariadis (1981) showed that conditions for stationary sunspot 
equilibria to arise are the following: (1) gross complementarity between the goods 
and (2) local stability (indeterminacy) of the monetary steady state. Proposition 2 
shows that this result holds even in a two-good, two-currency and two-agent per 
generation OLG economy.30
6  Robustness and extensions
In this section, we investigate whether our results are robust to changes in the 
assumptions of the model. For simplicity of exposition, we assume from now 
onwards that the old have no endowments: y
2
= 0.
28 See also Peck (1988) on how the multiplicity of equilibria in OLG models leads to existence of sun-
spot equilibria more generally. See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) on the link between indeterminacy and 
sunspots in other classes of models.
29 We have constructed sunspot equilibria in the case where the price of good 1 fluctuates, but the same 
could be done for good 2.
30 More precisely, notice that in our setting as well as in Azariadis (1981), gross complementarity actu-
ally implies local indeterminacy (see Proposition 1). As Woodford (1984) puts it, what is really neces-
sary for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria that remain within an arbitrarily small neighbour-
hood of a deterministic steady state in an OLG setting is indeed the indeterminacy of the steady state.
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6.1  Home bias
We now extend the model to allow for the presence of consumption home bias. In the 
absence of home bias, it is well known that the real exchange rate is equal to 1. In other 
words, the price of a consumption basket when converted into the same currency is 
identical across countries. However, one of the most established facts in the literature 
is that the purchasing-power parity (PPP) does not hold (Rogoff 1996). Moreover, the 
empirical literature has found that there is a comovement between the nominal and the 
real exchange rate (see, e.g. Burstein and Gopinath 2014). While the introduction of 
home bias into the model takes care of PPP deviations, it remains to be seen whether 
the model can replicate the strong positive correlation between the nominal and the real 
exchange rate. Therefore, the main purpose of this section is to look into other aspects 
surrounding the behaviour of the exchange rate, in particular those concerning the rela-
tionship between the nominal and the real exchange rate.
Let us introduce the following utility function:
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and C1h,t and 
C2h,t+1 are the consumption indices of the young and the old, respectively:
and  = 1

 . Under this parameter restriction, this utility function is then exactly the 
same as (7). This different formulation is useful to introduce in order to calculate 
the consumption-based price index as standard in the literature. For simplicity, let 




≡ aH , which means that the degree of home bias is the 
same across countries.
In the Supplementary Material (Section D), we show that the consumption-based 
price indices of the two countries are:
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It is then straightforward to see that in the absence of home bias ( aH = 1
2
 ), then 
Qt = 1 . On the other hand, when aH >
1
2
 the PPP condition does not hold.
In the Supplementary Material, we also show that the dynamic system dichot-
omises even in the presence of home bias (as in Sect. 2), so that Eqs. (18) and (19) 
still characterise the dynamic behaviour of p1 and p2.31 Hence, in the long-run, two 
prices satisfy the same equations as under the absence of home bias (see Result 1).
On the other hand, Eq. (20) is replaced by the following expression:
where
It is easy to see that we cannot express the nominal exchange rate as an explicit 
function of future prices as in Sect. 2 [see Eq. (20)].
In the presence of home bias, generically we cannot find a closed-form solution 
for the nominal exchange rate even at the steady state of the economy. An analyti-
cal solution can be found when countries are symmetric, in the sense that they have 
the same money supplies and endowments: M1 = M2 = M and y1 = y2 = y . In that 
case, it can be checked that e∗ = 1.
In order to look at the dynamics of the real and the nominal exchange rate, let us 
consider the case where the monetary steady state is locally indeterminate. With-
out loss of generality, let us assume that agents believe that the price of good 1 is 
at the steady-state level ( p1
0
= p1∗ ) while agents coordinate on an initial value for 
the price of good 2 different than the steady state one p2
0
≠ p2∗ . As for Fig. 1, let us 
set  = 0.4729 ,  = 0.25 and M1 = M2 = 1 . When y
2
= 0 , notice that y◦ = 0 (see 
Proposition 1). This implies that local indeterminacy does not depend anymore on 
the level of endowments in the two countries. Without loss of generality, we also set 
y1 = y2 = 1.
We then compute the equilibrium paths of the nominal and the real exchange rate 
for the following range of the home bias parameter: aH = {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} . We 
find that there is comovement of the nominal and the real exchange rate for all these 




























































































31 Additionally, this property holds even when the degree of home bias differs across countries.
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In particular, Figs. 2 and 3 show, respectively, the dynamics for relatively open 
economies and more closed economies. When the two countries are relatively more 
close, the dynamics of the real exchange rate tracks very closely the dynamics of 
the nominal exchange rate. When the two countries are relatively more open, there 
is still comovement but the amplitude of fluctuations of the real exchange rate is 
smaller. This is intuitive, since the real exchange rate would be
6.2  Timing of portfolio choice
In Sect. 2, we have assumed that the portfolio of currencies that the old need to buy 
the consumption goods is determined when young. We will now investigate whether 
our results still hold when we relax this assumption.
In particular, we consider a setting where the agents are instead subject to the fol-
lowing budget constraints:
Notice that Eqs. (41)–(43) are the same as Eqs. (1)–(3).32 The key difference is that 
we allow the old to determine their portfolio in the current period (Eq. 44). We also 
impose that only the domestic currency serves as store of value (Eq. 47). In fact, 
recall that the currencies would be perfect substitutes if both can be used as store of 
value leading to a constant and indeterminate exchange rate as in Kareken and Wal-
lace (1981) (see Supplementary Material, Section A).
We provide the first-order conditions and the derivation of the model in the Sup-









































32 The only difference is that we need to use an additional index to distinguish the money purchased at 
the beginning of the period by the young ( m̄
1h,t
 ) from the money purchased at the beginning of the period 
by the old ( m̄
2h,t+1
 ). We have also dropped the age subscript in the endowment of the young and her 
wealth, since the old have no endowment.
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found by solving a dynamic system of three equations in three unknowns ( p1, p2, e ). 
In particular, the equilibrium equations are the following33:













Fig. 2  Nominal and real exchange rate for aH = 0.6











Fig. 3  Nominal and real exchange rate for aH = 0.8
33 Since the endowments of the old are equal to zero, the demand for the domestic currency is always 
positive. Hence, we have no dynamic inequality constraints to satisfy in this case.
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where
The long-run solution for the prices and the exchange rate can be obtained by impos-
ing p
t
= p∗ and et = e∗ in the above system of equations. It is then immediate to 
show that the unique stationary monetary equilibrium is:
Notice that these expressions are identical to those found in Sect.  3 for y
2
= 0 . It 
can also be verified that the consumption allocations are the same under these two 
alternative specifications of the model. This shows that the result that the nominal 
exchange rate is a function of the fundamentals at the steady state of the economy 
does not depend on the timing of the portfolio choice. The presence of the cash-in-
advance constraints is enough to pin down the nominal exchange rate in the long-run.
Differently from Sect.  2, the dynamic system when the portfolios of the old are 
determined in the current period is much more complicated and cannot be solved ana-
lytically in blocks.
To investigate whether the monetary steady state can be locally indeterminate, we 
can use the implicit function theorem in the following way. Firstly, observe that the sys-
tem of equations describing the dynamics of the economy are three implicit nonlinear 





















































































































































= 0 with i = 1, 2, 3.
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Clearly, we have that fi(p∗, e∗) = 0 with i = 1, 2, 3 . The Jacobian of this system eval-
uated at the steady state, i.e. (Df )(p∗, e∗) , is:
Let us call with DL and DR the 3 × 3 matrices at the left and at the right side of the 
vertical line, respectively. Suppose also that DR is invertible.
Then, there exists I ⊂ ℝ3
++
 containing (p∗, e∗) and a function g ∶ I → I  such that
In addition, g is continuous and differentiable in I  with the Jacobian matrix (evalu-
ated at the steady state) equals to
Then, local (in)determinacy of the steady state can be checked looking at the eigen-
values of this Jacobian matrix. Since all the three variables are non-predetermined, 
local determinacy emerges if and only if all the eigenvalues are outside the unit cir-
cle. In this case, the unique equilibrium path is the steady state itself and this can be 
obtained by ruling out all the explosive paths by setting all the initial conditions of 
the three variables at their steady state value.
Numerical computations show that local indeterminacy emerges for the same set-
ting of the parameters used to draw Fig. 1. Similarly to the previous model, we have 
also observed that local determinacy can be restored by increasing .34
The analysis then shows that the assumption that old agents cannot participate to 
currency markets is not crucial to obtain our results. In this alternative version of the 
model where old agents can participate to currency markets, we find that the nomi-
nal exchange rate is still pinned down by the same fundametals in the long run. The 
monetary steady state is also locally indeterminate under similar conditions, imply-
ing that there exists paths of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run value 
which are not driven by the fundamentals of the economy. However, we have shown 
that the local dynamics cannot be studied analytically in this particular setting.
The advantage of our friction in currency markets is then that it provides a 




































































































, et+1) = 0

























D(g)(p∗, e∗) = −(DR)−1DL
34 In particular, we have found that the steady state is always locally determinate starting with 𝜎 > 1 and 
keeping all the other parameters unchanged.
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while not being responsible for driving the main results. In our view, the robust-
ness analysis indicates that similar results could be obtained in OLG models with 
richer portfolio choices or alternative assumptions, as long as the currencies are 
not modelled to be perfect substitutes.
7  Conclusion
We have provided a theory of exchange rate determination where the value of the 
nominal exchange rate at any given period is pinned down by the expected pur-
chasing power of the two currencies in units of the respective domestic goods. At 
the monetary steady state, the prices of the two goods are a function of the fun-
damentals of the respective economies; hence, the nominal exchange rate is itself 
a function of the fundamentals. Empirical evidence indeed suggests that the link 
between exchange rates and fundamentals is stronger at longer horizons.
Under some conditions on agents’ preferences and endowments, the two prices 
can be locally indeterminate around the monetary steady state. It is enough that 
one of the two prices is indeterminate for the existence of a continuum of equi-
librium paths of the nominal exchange rate which all converge to the monetary 
steady state. The path that will prevail depends on the initial prices of the two 
goods and this gives rise to a different equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, 
the fundamentals of the economy are assumed to be constant. Our framework 
can then explain why the econometrician struggles to find a correlation between 
exchange rates and fundamentals at shorter horizons.
We also show that persistent fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate can 
emerge around its long-run value. In particular, we prove that as long as the mon-
etary steady state is locally indeterminate, then stationary sunspot equilibria exist. 
Therefore, random fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate arise purely as a 
result of self-fulfilling beliefs. If, e.g. we observe that a currency appreciates but 
the fundamentals of the underlying economy have not changed, our model sug-
gests that this could be because agents believe that the purchasing power of the 
currency goes up. According to our model, the weak link between the exchange 
rate and fundamentals at shorter horizons can be a consequence of people’s “ani-
mal spirits”. In previous OLG models in open economy, there is no room for two 
stores of value (currencies); hence, the nominal exchange rate is always indeter-
minate. This implies that the nominal exchange rate follows sunspot behaviour 
because of the lack of an equation that disciplines the behaviour of the nomi-
nal exchange rate. In our paper, there are conditions under which the nominal 
exchange rate is determinate, while conditions under which fluctuations unrelated 
to fundamentals can exist. Therefore, this paper provides a theory which can rec-
oncile two apparently contrasting strands of empirical evidence.
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Appendix 1
Deterministic economy: Lagrangian and first‑order conditions
Let 1h,t be the Lagrange multiplier associated to (6) while 12h,t+1 and 
2
2h,t+1
 are the 
multipliers associated to the budget constraint of the old (4) and (5). The Lagrangian 
function of agent h born at time t is35:







































































































35 Since we are interested in studying fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around the monetary 
steady state, we only study equilibria where money holdings are strictly positive.
 M. Bambi, S. Eugeni 
1 3
Deterministic economy: the initial old
The initial old is endowed with some units of the domestic currency and of the 
domestic good. To simplify the problem, we assume that the initial old gain utility 
only from the domestic good.36 In country 1:
subject to:
The solution is straightforward:
The maximisation problem of the initial old in country 2 is similar. Its solution 





















































































36 If we assumed that the initial old gained utility from both goods, we would need to assume that he 
is endowed with some units of the foreign good (given our utility function). We avoid this to ensure 
consistency with the pattern of endowments of future generations. Assuming that every generation is 
endowed with some units of the foreign good would considerably complicate the notation but not change 
our results.
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Deterministic economy: derivation of the dynamic system
Using the demand functions (16) and (17), we can write the market clearing equa-
tions for good 1 at time t as follows:
Using (4) and (17), the demand for currency 1 at time t and t − 1 can be written as:
Summing across h and assuming that the market for currency 1 clears at any t, we 
get upon rearranging:





> M1 holds since the aggregate consumption of the young of good 1 is positive.
Since the maximisation problem of the initial old is different, we need to check 
that this difference equation also holds at t = 0 . The market clearing condition for 
good 1 at t = 0 is:
Substituting Eq. (65) at t = 0 , we get:
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In a similar way, we can derive the equation describing the dynamics of good 2. 
Following the same steps as for good 1, the money market clearing equation for cur-
rency 2 at t can be written as:
Plugging the latter equation at t and t − 1 into the market clearing equations for good 
2, we can derive Eq. (19).
Finally, the expression for the nominal exchange rate (20) can be found by 
combining (65) and (67). Once the paths of the nominal price levels are known, 
Eq. (20) will pin down the path of nominal exchange rate. Hence, the consump-
tion and the portfolio allocations can be calculated using (16), (17) and (9)–(12).
Stochastic economy: first‑order conditions
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Combine (68) and (69) to obtain:
Plugging the last equation into (74):
which also implies that:
Using (68)–(71), (75)–(78), the two first-order conditions for the real money bal-
ances can be rewritten as:
Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We investigate the local dynamics around p∗ by looking at the slope of F(pt, pt+1) at 







































































































(1 − )y2 − ( + 
)y1
(1 + )y2 − (1 − )
y1
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Under the restriction y1 > ȳ , it is easy to show that the numerator is always negative. 
On the other hand, the denominator is positive if one of the following conditions 
is satisfied:  ≥ 1 or 𝜎 < 1 and y1 < ỹ . On the other hand, if 𝜎 < 1 and y1 > ỹ the 
denominator is positive. Observe also that ỹ > ȳ when 𝜎 < 1 . Taking into account 
this information, we are now ready to investigate whether |m| is lower, equal or 
greater than one.
We need to distinguish two cases:
Case 1:  ≥ 1 OR 𝜎 < 1 and y1 ∈ (ȳ, ỹ) : in this case, the steady state is locally 
unstable because m > 1 always. In fact 
 which is always satisfied from what said above.
Case 2: 𝜎 < 1 and y2 ∈ (ỹ,∞) : in this case m < 0 since both the denominator and 
numerator of (79) are negative. Therefore, to establish the local determinacy of p∗ , 
we need to check whether m < −1 . Doing that leads to the following: 
Now, 1 is always negative. It is straightforward to see that it is so when 1 − 2𝜎 < 0 . 





Looking now at 2 , it is clear that 𝛤2 > 0 always if 2 − 1 ≥ 0 . In addition, 𝛤2 > 0 
if 2𝜎 − 1 < 0 and 𝛽𝜎 > 1 − 2𝜎 while 𝛤2 < 0 if 2𝜎 − 1 < 0 and 𝛽𝜎 < 1 − 2𝜎.
Summing up the sign conditions just found, we have that: 
(a) 𝛤1 < 0 and 𝛤2 > 0 if  ≥
1
2
 or if 𝜎 < 1
2
 and  ∈ (1 − 2, 1];
(b) 𝛤1 < 0 and 𝛤2 < 0 if 𝜎 <
1
2
 and  ∈ (0, 1 − 2)
Clearly, under condition a) and looking at (80) we conclude that p∗ is locally determi-
nate. On the other hand, condition b) joint with (80) lead to conclude that p∗ is locally 
determinate if
and indeterminate otherwise. Finally, we need to verify whether y◦ is greater or 
lower than ỹ . After some computations, it emerges that y◦ > ỹ because otherwise 
𝛽2𝜎 + 2 + 2𝛽𝜎 < 0 . Therefore, we conclude that under condition b) p∗ is locally 
determinate when y1 ∈ (ỹ, y◦) while indeterminate if y2 ∈ (y◦,∞).
m > 1 ⇔ y1 > ȳ
(80)
m < −1 ⇔ (𝛽𝜎 − 2𝜎𝛽𝜎 − 1)
��������� ��������
≡𝛤1
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Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed in a number of steps, but the main idea is to adapt the strategy followed by 
Woodford (1984) to analyse a one-currency, one-good and one-agent economy to our 
framework.
Step 1. Firstly, we explore the implications of Assumption 1.
To start with, consider that preferences are homothetic (see Eq. (28)). This implies 
that consumption is a constant fraction of wealth. Therefore, we can write the con-
sumption of the old as follows:
where f 
h
(ss�) is a function of current and future prices. Since preferences, as speci-
fied by the discount factor, the elasticity of substitution and the beliefs (i.e. the tran-
sition probabilities) are the same across individuals, this must imply that:
Hence, the aggregate consumption of the old can be rewritten as follows:
Let us now define agent h’s share of aggregate consumption as:
Using the above reasoning, it is easy to show that the share of consumption only 
depends on an agent’s share of aggregate wealth:
As a consequence, it is independent of the future state and it is also the same across 
goods (hence the superscript can be dropped).
We have also assumed that agents believe that the terms of trade are constant. There-
fore, agents’ wealth does not fluctuate across states which means that each agent’s share 
of aggregate consumption is constant and equal to the steady-state value:
Using the budget constraint of the old, we can rewrite h as follows:
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This is a direct consequence of the aggregated budget constraint of the old for good 
2: constant aggregate money balances imply constant aggregate consumption of the 
old, hence constant aggregate consumption of the young. Given that the share of 
aggregate consumption for each good is also constant, the individual consumption 
of good 2 is also constant:
Taking into account all of the above plus the assumption of equal beliefs across 
agents, the first-order conditions (32) and (33) can be simplified as follows:
where
given Eq. (81).
Step 2. Since we have two agents and two states, we have four first-order condi-
tions for the real money balances of currency 1 (Eq. 82), which can be rewritten as 
follows:
Since Eq. (84) establishes a relationship between individual and aggregate real 
money balances, and the stochastic process for m̃1 is specified by Assumption 1, the 
transition probabilities can then be pinned down by the following equations:
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where m̃1(a) = m̃1∗ + zn and m̃1(b) = m̃1∗ + zx.
As Woodford (1984), we take the limit for z → 0 of the first-order conditions. If 
the right-hand sides are positive, then a stationary sunspot equilibrium exists as it can 
supported by positive probabilities. But since both the numerators and the denomina-
tors tends to zero when the economy approaches the monetary steady state, we apply 
Hopitâl’s rule.
Let us start with the agents born in state a and define:
After a few steps, it can be checked that:
where
Notice that, at the monetary steady state, the following first-order condition holds 
[see Eqs. (82, 84) for the right-hand side]:
We now use some results from Sect. 3, although assuming that y
2
= 0 . Firstly, the 
aggregate real money balances of good 1 are:
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which shows that the consumption of good 1 when young of agent h is nothing but a 
share of the savings of good 1.
Secondly, the share of consumption of agent 1 can be rewritten as:
Plugging (91) and (92) into S∗
h
 , we get that:
This confirms that beliefs across the two agents born in state a must be the same for 
stationary sunspot equilibria to exist:
Next, substituting (90) into (93) we obtain:
Following the same procedure for the agents born in state b, we obtain:
Notice that, when  → 1 , we have that S∗ → m , which is the slope of the difference 
equation for good 1 at the monetary steady state.37 In fact, when y2 = 0 , m becomes:
We can now link the existence of sunspot equilibria to the local stability of p1∗ and 
hence the monetary steady state.
Firstly, we should note that the conditions for the indeterminacy of p1∗ are 
slightly different when y2 = 0 . To start with, let us check the conditions under which 
0 < m < 1 . m > 0 only if 𝜎 > 1 . However, when 𝜎 > 1 , m < 1 is impossible since 























































































































37 See the proof of Proposition 1 when y2 = 0.
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𝜎 < 1 , then m < 0 always holds. It is easy to check that m > −1 when 𝛽𝜎 < 1 − 2𝜎 . 
Since 𝛽 > 0 , we would also require that 𝜎 < 1
2
 . Therefore, for indeterminacy to occur 
the conditions on agents’ preferences remain the same when y2 = 0 . However, we do 
not have any condition on y1.
Finally, it can be verified that for 1 → 0 , then − 1 < S∗ < 0 when 𝜎 <
1
2
 . Since 
S∗ is monotonically decreasing in ∗
1
 , then − 1 < S∗ < 0 for any ∗
1
 . It is then possible 
to find a continuum of n and x such that the two ratios of probabilities are positive.
Step 3. To conclude, note that as z → 0 the first-order condition for currency 2 
(83) becomes:
which is the first-order condition for currency 2 at the monetary steady state.
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